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
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VI.

A  
LETTER,  
gc. &c.



A  
**LETTER**

BY

*A N E N G L I S H M A N,*

LATELY ON HIS

*Travels in Italy;*

WRITTEN ON HIS RETURN TO ENGLAND,

*IN AUGUST, 1814.*

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W. Flint, Printer, Old Bailey, London.



A  
LETTER,

*&c. &c.*

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MY DEAR FRIEND,

I AM just arrived from the delightful climates of Italy, which, notwithstanding the calamities of the war, of which that country has lately been the theatre, is still that classic soil from whence have sprung learning, and the sciences, the fine arts, and all others that have their source in the fervour of the imagination.

You remember that I embarked at Plymouth for Palermo: I was desirous of observing the degree of happiness, that our ministers had ordained in favour of the Sicilians. My voyage was fortunate, and I remained some time in the island, making attentive remarks, not only on the customs and manners of the inhabitants, and the effects produced on them by the new constitution, but every thing else of curiosity, and antiquity, that has rendered the island of Sicily so justly celebrated.

When I was on the point of quitting the island, there was a strong rumour of the speedy return of Ferdinand to the royal authority, and of the cessation of that of his son Francis, who had, for some time, represented the king, as his Vicar General, or Lord Lieutenant of Sicily.

The King's party affirmed, that his return would be the first step towards promoting the public happiness; the party of the Prince was in great agitation: those who had decidedly pronounced themselves for the English, were making preparations for escaping persecution; and the majority of the people, who eagerly looked forwards to that state of felicity, likely to result from a constitutional form of government, was much disappointed, on seeing that the English constitution, militarily applied to the climates and character of the inhabitants of the environs of Etna, was not so equally adapted to their volcanic heads, as it was to the cool reflecting minds of those who reside on the misty borders of the Thames.

With respect to the interior prosperity of the island, hitherto it existed only in the offices of government; that is to say, it was solemnly promised by every new actor, who took a part in the administration.

On my arrival at Naples, I found that country

in a very different state : now governed by a great captain, a prince endowed with a loyal and enterprizing character, who had even succeeded in awakening a national spirit ; who had created an army well disciplined and brave ; formed institutions both political and judiciary ; established a system of education, in harmony with the progress of knowledge in the present age ; and finally who had introduced a prudent and generous policy, and had not hesitated to make the greatest sacrifices, in order to secure to the kingdom of Naples its independence, and that peace and prosperity which ought to be the result of it.

But, as even in promoting the public good, obstacles are frequently met with, and as every government finds men but too much inclined to oppose its measures ; so there are some, whom I suspect by their language, to be in correspondence with the court of Palermo, or at least, much prejudiced in favour of their old customs : these men I have frequently heard dispute whether King Joachim Murat ought to continue to reign, after the recal of some of the Bourbons to their thrones ; they maintain that the new King Joachim had nothing in his favour but the right of conquest, while on the other hand the old King Ferdinand, had in his favour the right of hereditary succession. You would have thought that these coffee-house politicians were already holding the con-

gress of Vienna, and that their opinion, issued from the southern extremity of Europe, ought to regulate the political conduct of the high allied powers assembled on the borders of the Danube.

On my passage through France, I did not find there such peremptory politicians: the true Frenchmen who love justice, and are enthusiastic admirers of military bravery, far from wishing ill to their gallant compatriot, were convinced that the happiness of Naples, and the tranquillity of all that beautiful country, depended on its preserving a king, well capable by his courage and military talents of defending his kingdom, much better than the princes of the former dynasty, who had twice abandoned it, and who are as incapable of defending it, as of reconquering it. A king defends his kingdom by the valour of his arms, he consolidates his government by virtuous qualities and wise regulations. Which of the two, then, has a better claim to the possession of these requisite qualities? Is it a king who at two different periods became a fugitive to his Sicilian island? or is it not, rather, Joachim Murat, taking up arms with success, to preserve the kingdom of Naples from all those calamities, which have afflicted, in these latter times, almost all the countries of Europe?

I could not have conceived, that the propriety



of continuing Joachim on the throne of Naples would be a matter of dispute; but as there are some few partisans of old Ferdinand, and as a protestation of the King of Sicily has been inserted in the newspapers, I think it consistent with the interest of my country, to propose the question for the discussion of those true English politicians, who are sincerely attached to the glory of the nation, who give their approbation to the measures of our government, and who are proud of the dignified influence which our glorious country now exercises over the politics of Europe.

It is purely with this intention, that I have collected, in the course of my travels in Italy, several positive, and incontestable facts, and which ought to have great weight in deciding the dispute in question, as well as on the prosperity or ruin of the kingdom of Naples: for after having gone through the provinces of Naples, after having listened to the public opinion, and drawn the fairest conclusions from it, I do not hesitate in affirming, that the return of old Ferdinand would be the beginning of the greatest civil dissensions, of numberless emigrations, of calamities, and proscriptions of every kind; whilst, on the contrary, the simple maintenance of the existing order of things, and of Joachim as king, would prove the most powerful guarantee of the tranquillity of the

country, the happiness of the population, and of the prosperity of the kingdom.

That I may be able to treat in a certain degree of order the question, which I take the liberty of presenting to the sagacity and justice inherent to my countrymen, I think it right to consider it under three points of view :—

1st. That of the history of the political facts, and military events, which have brought about the actual order of things in Naples.

2d. Certain rights, rendered sacred in Europe by general opinion, and by the general principle of the law of nations.

3d. Finally, the happiness and prosperity of the Neapolitan people, which, under every good government, ought to be the principal, and only object.

#### FIRST.

*History of the political facts, and military events, which have brought about the actual order of things in Naples.*

Formerly kings, as being the chief magistrates and the principal soldiers of their country, defended their throne, or had the glory of perishing while defending it with courage; but in modern

times, we have seen kings desert their duty, and their throne, by taking refuge in distant countries; until the political storm was dissipated; consequently, a conduct so different in the sovereigns of ancient and modern times, must necessarily produce another order of maxims in policy and rights.

If it were otherwise, and if no change were to take place in the privileges of nations, by the act of deserting the throne, and abandoning the government, the primitive treaty, the natural ties, which unite monarchs and their subjects, governments, and nations, would be illusive and dangerous; since a similar theory would shelter kings, and afford them protection against all political events, but would expose nations to the calamities of civil and foreign wars.

Let us now see what has been the conduct of the old King Ferdinand.

The Neapolitan government, during the reigns of the Bourbons, was constantly regulated by a policy at once changeable, dubious and pusillanimous; so as never to be faithful to its friends, nor decided against its enemies. It was sometimes at peace, sometimes at war with France. It has been observed now signing treaties on one part, and on the other assisting others in a sense directly contrary,

The first treaty was signed the 10th of October 1796, by the Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, on the side of the Neapolitan government, and by the French minister Charles de la Croix.

. This peace was broken by the aggression of the Neapolitan army in 1798; the consequence was, that the French troops, to the number of only twelve thousand men, invaded the kingdom of Naples, and totally dispersed, in less than forty days, an army of fifty thousand men, well furnished with every thing, and provided with a formidable train of artillery.

. This event took place immediately after, that Ferdinand, who had at first marched at the head of his army, in the rapidity of his flight, had embarked, and taken refuge at Palermo.

The Neapolitan populace had taken arms for the defence of the metropolis, but soon gave itself up to the most unrestrained excesses of anarchy, and signalized its respect and affection for the monarch by the plundering of the royal palace, which became a scene of ruin and disorder. The entry of the French troops soon restored order, and every class of the citizens united in proclaiming a republican government. Six months after this, the losses and disasters of the French army in Upper Italy, obliged it to concentrate its forces, and to



abandon Naples. In so short an interval, it was impossible to have organized either the government or the army; the want of treasure did not allow of it. For not only had the preceding government left a *deficit* in the public banks, of more than 140 millions of livres, \* but it had carried off all the specie it had been able to collect and borrow by way of contribution. †

It was then, that we had the novel sight of a cardinal placing himself at the head of four or five thousand men, commanded by captains of banditti, and mendicant friars, reconquering the kingdom, giving the signal, and setting the example of pillage and murder, through the entire rout from Reggio to Naples, exciting his army to the committing of the most horrible excesses on the richest houses of the capital, ‡ dragging, § impri-

\* The bank paper, which represented the property of individuals, was gradually diminishing till it came down to 0; the bank was shut. The government, on its return from Palermo, established a new tax for the payment of the interest of its debt, at the rate only of 3 per cent., the capital first reduced to the fourth part.

† A forced loan at the rate of 5 per cent. in the year 1798, on all gold and silver manufactured.

‡ The palaces of Prince Stigliano Colonna, Duke of Monteleone, Prince Impenale, Duke of Riario, Duke of Canzano, Duke of Andria, many other nobles, and some thousands of persons of lesser note.

§ The Duchess of Cassano, Duchess of Popoli Montemileto,

soning and assassinating even in the streets, and in the public squares, the greatest proprietors of Naples, and others, men the most distinguished by their talents, \* their knowledge, and their patriotic virtues ; and all this, under the specious pretext of republicanism.

The acts of vengeance, and the crimes of every kind that almost immediately took place after the return of the royal family to Naples ; and which were prolonged through a period of eighteen months, cannot be described. The numberless families of victims sacrificed to satiate the furious passions let loose on these bloody scenes of civil reaction, can alone describe them in the forcible terms they require, and conformably to the strictest truth. The only individuals who escaped from so many excesses, were those who emigrated, and the prisoners admitted to amnesty by the effects of the new treaty of peace, concluded with France, and signed at Florence the 28th day of March, 1801.†

Prince Torello, Duke of Riario, Duke of Monteleone, Duke of Mondragone, Prince Strongoli, &c. &c.

\* Dr. Cirello, the Judge Pagano the Bishop of Vico, Conforti, D. D. &c. &c. &c.

† The commander of an English squadron in the bay of Naples, with a view of saving a number of people of distinguished rank and talents, who had taken refuge in the castles, granted a general amnesty by capitulation ; and yet many of them were afterwards condemned and executed, others

This state of peace gave the flattering hopes of a long and durable repose, which in fact was realized in part by a treaty of armed neutrality, concluded in 1805, between France and the Neapolitan government, at the moment that a new war was on the point of breaking out in Germany.

Whilst the court of Naples was thus engaged in the act of signing an armed neutrality with France, it was at the same time occupied in persuading the English and Russians that the Neapolitan government was most sincerely attached to their interests: the success of this measure produced, on the part of these powers, a landing of thirteen or fourteen thousand of their troops at Naples.

This transaction of the Neapolitan government led to a rupture with France; but the allied division soon re-embarked again, well convinced of the impossibility of calculating, for the future, on the energy of a government which enjoyed neither the power over, nor the confidence or the devotion of its army.

The success of the battle of Austerlitz, having, soon after enabled the government of France to march a body of troops to the south of Italy, this

were imprisoned and exiled. Thus the guarantee and protection of a most powerful nation was not even respected.

army had orders to undertake the conquest of the Neapolitan states.

King Ferdinand, now apprehensive of falling into fresh embarrassments, abandoned Naples for the *second time*, retiring to Sicily, immediately after the departure of the Anglo-Russians, leaving his son, the hereditary prince, his Vicar General, or Lord Lieutenant.

In the mean time the French army, under the orders of *Joseph Bonaparte*, but in reality, commanded by *Marshal Massena*, with forced marches, advanced rapidly towards Naples.

The Queen, and the hereditary Prince, sent ambassadors, several times, to Joseph, imploring either a peace or an armistice, and to offer hostages to him, thinking to deprecate thus the menaced overthrow of the throne of Ferdinand; but all their propositions were rejected.

The Prince then created a regency, composed of three persons, of whom one was to be the president, with two secretaries, all chosen from the nobility, the military, and the first rank of the magistracy. He conferred on this regency, not only the executive part of the government during his absence, but also that of treating with the enemy respecting the cession of the forts, and of that part of the kingdom already occupied by the French

troops, comprising the metropolis, indicating as a line of demarcation, or division of the territory, certain points in the province of Principatà citra. The Prince proposed to defend these lines with the troops he had sent into that country.

The Queen, and the rest of the royal family, embarked for Palermo.

Two deputies, chosen out of the regency, were then sent with proper instructions, empowering them to treat with Joseph for the surrender of the city of Naples; a convention was signed, and ratified, by the deputies of the regency, on one part; and by Joseph, and a French general, on the other. On the 13th of February, 1806, the French army entered Capua, and the next day at Naples.

A short time after, the army of the hereditary Prince, warmly pursued, and having made a slight appearance of an intention to sustain a combat, soon passed the straits of the Faro. Gaeta, after an obstinate defence, surrendered also, and the whole kingdom of Naples was conquered.

The Emperor of the French, in virtue of his right of conquest, created his brother Joseph King of Naples. The Neapolitan nation took the oath of fidelity to the new monarch, who governed, by this title, to the period of the treaty of



**Bayonne.** It is essential that we observe, that the then reigning family of Spain had previously acknowledged Joseph as King of Naples. Charles the fourth not only addressed to him a letter of felicitation, but he also accredited, at the court of the new king, the same *chargé d'affaires*, who had acted in that capacity in the preceding government.\*

By a treaty signed at Bayonne, *Joachim Murat*, who had been already acknowledged as Grand Duke of Berg, by all the powers on the continent of Europe, ceded his dukedom, in exchange for the kingdom of Naples ; he made his entry in his new states, in August, 1808, and immediately after took possession of the throne.

The new monarch met with the most distinguished reception from a nation, that we now see capable of the highest degree of exaltation at the idea of those brilliant military talents, which have ever characterized the nations of Italy in the most eminent degree. The Neapolitan people took the oath of allegiance and fidelity to King *Joachim*, who was also acknowledged by all the powers of Europe except England. This Prince has justified, by his conduct, the expectations, and the hopes of the Neapolitan nation. He has supported a war, in order to procure for his

\* Chev. D. Pio Gomen,

people, the protection of a *great power*; and, indeed, how many acts of injustice and personal injuries, has he not been obliged to suffer, and even to sacrifice his resentments to more important considerations !!!

The moment being come, for shaking off the yoke of despotism, this monarch found himself combated by his personal feelings, and a high sense of his duty: he knew that he had a solemn pact, with the Neapolitan nation to fulfil, this was, to watch over its well being.

The wish, and the positive need of securing the independence, and the preservation of his people, are sentiments that speak most forcibly to the feelings of King Joachim: he forms a decided resolution of entering into the coalition, which must finally restore peace to Europe; and makes a treaty with the Emperor of Austria, which meets the approbation of Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain.

This latter power, too magnanimous and too loyal to be wanting in her prior engagements with the Sicilian government, only concluded an indefinite armistice with the Neapolitan government. From the moment that these two powers agreed to act in concert in favour of the common cause, a state of warfare was as equally without a motive,

as without an object. This armistice will naturally be the prelude to those definitive arrangements which will bring about a durable and solid peace between the English and Neapolitan nations, and restore them to their reciprocal and natural interests.

Before, even, that the ratification of the treaty with Austria was received, King Joachim marches his troops into Italy, overturns the French government, and that of the kingdom of Italy, from Terracina to Bologna; carries Ancona by force, and occupies the castle of St. Angelo, Civita Vecchia, the forts of Leghorn, and those of the other parts of Tuscany.

The campaign of Italy was neither long, nor worthy of remark; the Neapolitan troops, under the immediate command of their king, were victorious, in every occasion that presented itself of fighting. From the moment that the Neapolitan army began to direct its march towards Rome, the French-Italian army commenced its retreat, abandoning the line of the Isonzo. It again retreated from the strong position of the Adige, in order to place itself behind the Mincio, as soon as King Joachim occupied Bologna. Under these circumstances, it is not the merits of a victory that ought to be considered, so much as the honour and advantage of having delivered the



southern parts of Italy from all the forces of the enemy, and of having kept at bay the army of the Viceroy, superior in number, composed of good soldiers, and commanded by a skilful general, though but young.

On receiving intelligence of the important events of Paris, at the time that the Neapolitan troops were under the walls of Piacenza, attacking the place with vigour, hostilities were suspended. The troops of King Joachim afterwards retired into the kingdom of Naples, a part only remaining to occupy the three ancient departments of the Metauro, Musone, and the Tronte, in force of a convention concluded with the Austrian general in chief.

## SECOND.

*Certain rights rendered sacred in Europe by general opinion, and by the general principles of the law of nations.*

When we repossess the history of different nations, of their wars, of their conquests, of their negotiations, of their treaties ; when we cast our eyes on that crowd of *races*, or *dynasties*, whether founded on conquest, or elective, whether hereditary or cessionary in virtue of treaties, or whether they may have been called to the throne by the will of the people, we shall never be able to trace any other source or origin of the sovereign power, or authority of princes and governments, than the following :

1st. The right of conquest.

2d. The right of election, and that of hereditary succession when the election was but for form's sake, and that the supreme power has been continued in the same family.

3d. The right of cession, either by transaction, or by a diplomatic negotiation.

4th. A solemn appeal made by a whole nation inviting a king, a prince, or a particular family, to accept of the throne, a right which I ought to have placed in the first place, because it is a voluntary act, is independent, taking its source in the true sovereignty, that of the people.

In the first place, the *right of conquest*, is the most ancient, the most undeniable, and likewise the most universal. All the monarchical states now existing in Europe have no other origin than the right of conquest, exercised by the Germanic Tribes, by the Sarmatians and Muscovites over the ruined remains of the Roman empire. It is not possible to invoke a more perfect constitutional chart, than that on which all the European monarchies are founded. It is also on the right of conquest, that the foundation has been laid of many of the recent dynasties, now reigning at this moment in Europe.

In the second place, when the times were more tranquil, and that invasions and conquests became less frequent, certain states have chosen their chiefs, kings, princes, emperors, or governors, from the body of the nation or otherwise. Afterwards, in order to avoid the troubles, and intestine dissensions, which were naturally the effects produced by the ambition of reigning, or by the number of pretenders to the throne, various nations conceived the idea of avoiding the dangerous and terrible period of royal elections, by establishing an hereditary succession in favour of a particular family; that is to say, by continuing the first election, translating it to the first born, or first male offspring of the reigning family.

In the third place, when after long wars, or with a view to avoid them for the future, it was thought advisable to make exchanges, and intercessions of states and kingdoms, a new source of legitimate power was opened for those princes and governors who were the objects of the exchanges, or who stipulated those kind of cessions. Of this the history of European diplomacy presents us a crowd of examples.

Fourthly, a solemn invitation, or calling to the throne, of a king, prince, or particular family, by an entire nation making use of its own sovereignty, is the most natural right, the most

sacred of all, the most incontrovertible, and has been exercised many times, in Italy, in Spain, in England, in Poland, and even in Russia.

Finally, that, which in modern times, confirms all those different rights, is that they become diplomatically recognized by the other states and monarchs of Europe, when they accredit *plenipotentiary ministers* at the courts of some one of those princes, kings, or governments recently established, whether it may have been by right of conquest, by right of election, by hereditary succession, by right of exchange, by treaty, by cession, or, finally, by a national calling of a prince to the vacant throne.

The general history of Europe, in almost every page, enforces some one of those rights or sources of the royal power, that I have enumerated.

Do you wish for some historical examples on the exercise of the right of conquest? I will give you some.

Anno 507—Clovis, reigned over France, or rather over the Gauls, only by right of conquest, as did likewise the first of the Merovingian race.

800—Charlemagne, so famous in the second race, rendered himself master of a great part of

Germany, and of Italy; he goes to Rome, where he has himself crowned Emperor of the West; what other right claimed he, if not that of *conquest*?

476—When Odoacer, chief of the Herulians, founded the kingdom of Italy, what other right did he make use of, but that of *conquest*?

396—When Agisulph, at the head of the Lombards, became master of all Italy, and governed it at his pleasure, had he any other chart, than that of *conquest*?

1400—Zadislav Jagellon, King of Poland, did he not establish himself on the throne of Hungary and Bohemia, by the right of conquest, though the Emperor Maximilian, desirous of having these two kingdoms, invoked, and claimed his rights?

The right of conquest is that which has been the most generally exercised and acknowledged.

The right of cession, of exchange, and of treaties, presents us other examples.

Philip d'Evreux, married Jane, daughter of Charles the handsome, King of Navarre; he reigned there by virtue of the cession that was made to him by Philip of Valois, King of France. Navarre had been re-united to France by the marriage of

Philip, called the handsome, with Jane, Queen of Navarre.

Hanover, which had been possessed for a thousand years by the house, or family of the Guelfs, has it not passed, about a century ago, and that in virtue of a cession or treaty, into the family of Brunswick, now reigning in England?

756—Didien, Duke of Tuscany obtained the throne of Lombardy, on giving to the Pope the Duchies of Ferrara and Ancona.

1707—Did not Frederic the 1st, accept by treaty, of the sovereignty of Neufchatel, and Vallengin?

1718—Victor Amadea, Duke of Savoy, who had obtained the kingdom of Sicily, in force only of the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, did he not afterwards exchange it with the Emperor of Austria, for the possession of Sardinia, with the title of king?

1748—By what right did the house of Austria possess the duchy of Milan, if it were not by the cessions, and by the stipulations of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

912—As to election, and national will, which



is the most legitimate of all right; on the death of Lewis the *debonnaire*, did not Germany repulse from the Imperial throne, the family of Charlemagne, in order to place on it, Conrad, Count of Franconia, with the simple title of King of Germany?

1494—Cosmo de Medicis, was he not named grand duke by the pleasure of the Tuscans?

1640—When the crown of Portugal fell to the lot of Philip the second, King of Spain, by what right did the Portuguese shake off the yoke of the Spaniards, to govern themselves independently, and to place on the throne John Duke of Braganza, whose posterity reigns to this day? By what right the Portuguese, *like the Neapolitans*, who have separated themselves from the King of Sicily, and who have shed their blood in order to sustain King Joachim on the throne—have they acted thus, if it is not in virtue of that eternal right, inherent in all nations, of living under the monarch, or under the government the most conformable to their interests, or to their sovereign opinion?

Was it not in virtue of this incontestable right, that the English, after having obliged James the second, the last of the Stewarts, to abdicate the throne, chose William Henry, Prince of Orange,

and Stadtholder of Holland ? In the same manner, the whole kingdom of Naples has taken the oath of fidelity to *Joachim Murat*, to whom France, exercising the right of conquest, had ceded the kingdom.

In confining ourselves even to historical facts concerning the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, we might cite some political events, which confirm the legitimacy of the right of *Joachim Murat* to the throne of Naples. It would be sufficient to ask of the grave publicists who attack him (biassed more by their passions, than by impartial principles of reasoning) by what right did *Roger II.* unite Sicily to the kingdom of Naples, and cause himself to be crowned *King of the Two Sicilies*; if it were not in virtue of the right of conquest, exercised by *Roger 1st*, son of the celebrated *Tancred*, who had rendered himself master of Sicily at the head of his Normans, and in dispossessing the Saracens ?

1266—By what right did *Charles of Anjou*, brother to *St. Lewis*, King of France, get possession of Naples, in prejudice to *Conrad*, of the Imperial House of Suabia, legitimate heir to the Norman princes, but by the right of arms and conquest ?

How did *Alphonso King of Arragon*, get pos-



session of the kingdom of Naples, after the extinction of the house of Anjou, but by the right of force and conquest ?

Was it not by treaty that the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was reunited to the Spanish monarchy, after the death of Ferdinand of Arragon, called the Catholic, married to Isabella of Castille.

1720—The kingdom of Naples, when ceded to Austria, in 1720, was it not by the political right of exchange and treaty ?

1734—Was it not by the lot of arms, that D. Carlos, son of the King of Spain, rendered himself master of Naples and Sicily ? Was it not by the right of conquest, that the ancient title of King of the Two Sicilies was revived ? Therefore, when, in 1806, France, being victorious, and in opposing the aggression of King Ferdinand, acquired possession of the kingdom of Naples, abandoned by its king, and by the military desertion of his son, who had full powers to defend the kingdom, or to treat with France respecting it ; is it not, again, in virtue of the same right of war and conquest, which had already disposed, on several occasions of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, that France had placed King Joseph on the throne of Naples, and afterwards exchanged and ceded

the kingdom to Joachim, who re-ceded the principalities of Cleves and Berg?

Hence, on the authority of facts interspersed through the diplomatic history of Europe, all kings and heads of governments exercise their power by the right of war and conquest only; or by the right acquired by cessions, exchanges, and treaties; or by the legal and formal will of nations.

Upon these facts and authorities then, incontrovertibly established, *Joachim Murat* re-unites, in his person, many of these rights which entitle him to reign over the kingdom of Naples.

1st. The right of conquest, which is legitimate, as Ferdinand was the aggressor in his conduct towards the government of France. Joachim, now reigning in Naples, enjoys the right of conquest acquired by France, and the right of cession, stipulated, on giving up by treaty, the principalities of Cleves and Berg, to France, in exchange for her rights of conquest over the kingdom of Naples.

2d. The acknowledgment in diplomatic form of King *Joachim*, by several powers of Europe, who have sent him their ministers, ambassadors, or diplomatic agents, strongly legalizes and confirms the right of cession and exchange stipulated with France, and the *territorial sovereign* of the principalities of Cleves and Berg.

3d. If to these rights of conquest and exchange, and of the diplomatic recognizance of *Joachim Murat*, as King of Naples, by the different powers, we add the important circumstance of the desertion and abdication of the Throne of Naples by Ferdinand, and the abandoning completely of the Neapolitan nations at two different times consecutively by Ferdinand, and by his son, who had been invested with his powers, we must be convinced that these two Princes have, of themselves, dissolved the Neapolitan subjects from the oath of fidelity.

What remains then to *Ferdinand*, and his son the *Vicar General*? the right of hereditary succession? But that a claim to this right be just, he ought to have known how to preserve it, or to reconquer it when lost. An hereditary right is nothing without the requisite courage to defend it on occasion, and those virtues which may entitle one to revive one's claim to it. It is for want of this, that the annals of Europe are full of useful examples of a change in the reigning dynasties, when they cease to be founded on strength and virtue.

Hereditary right is not, what some courtiers and venal slaves in every clime and in every age have thought, a patrimony, a property in the people, a moveable and immoveable succession of territory and subjects.

The true definition of hereditary right is this: it is an *election* continued in favor of a particular family, but continued under the conditions cited above, and indispensable, of virtue and courage in those chosen, and continued under the names of hereditary princes.

Hence it comes, that we read in history that the Merovingian race or dynasty lost the right of hereditary succession, when it no longer possessed the virtues and the talents necessary to reign. This dynasty disappeared the day that Pepin assumed the title of king of France in 752, and condemned the last of the Merovingians to a monastic life.

It was thus, that the second dynasty of the *Carlovingians*, so great and brave under Pepin and Charlemagne, in its turn lost its right to hereditary succession, or continued election, when Hugh Capet was elected king of France by the nobility, in 987, in preference to Charles Duke of Lorraine, the nearest heir of the race of Charlemagne.

No, certainly: Nature never intended to mark out from amongst mankind any particular *cast*, nor any privileged family to reign over different states. No! there is no where on earth, an exclusive race or breed of kings or governors. Patriotic virtues, valour, courage, justice and wisdom:—

these only entitle kings to their thrones :—it is the gratitude of a happy people, it is the public opinion that sustains them. It is thus that claims or titles to a political hereditary succession, are of no value, unless founded on the general prosperity, liberty and happiness, that nations enjoy through the virtuous qualities of their governors.

### THIRD.

*On the happiness of the Neapolitans, and on the prosperity of the kingdom.*

Every acute observer will have remarked, that so much trouble and agitation in Europe has happened, only because certain governments have too much neglected the principal object of their institution,—the public felicity, and the general prosperity.

If the happiness of a nation is the truest title of a king ; and if that happiness consists in causing a nation to be respected abroad, and in protecting at home the personal safety of all, the liberty, property, and industry of individuals, we find this end entirely accomplished at Naples by the beneficial effects produced by the government of Joachim, who has inspired a national spirit in a country so long agitated by violent parties, and rendered amiable the royal authority, which had been for a long time, so persecuting and odious.



From whence we may conclude that *affection towards a king, is no more than an affection for his government, and an acknowledgment of his justice.*

Joachim Murat has succeeded in a very few years in forming a navy, as far as is necessary for the defence of the coasts, and for protecting the commerce of the kingdom. He has excited and encouraged industry, manufactures, and commerce, as much as the general state of warfare would permit him. He has formed an army prone to war, and well-disciplined, and which has recently given proofs of courage and order, when it was incumbent on it to protect the Ecclesiastical States, and the Grand Dukedom of Tuscany, against the calamities which threatened those countries.

The jurisprudence has been reformed; the tribunals administer justice throughout the provinces with zeal and equity.

The taxes are uniformly distributed, and each Neapolitan blesses the order and regularity now established by the government of Joachim.

Let us now compare this statement, the work of a few years, with the result of the government of the last dynasty, during the space of seventy years, that it reigned over Naples, and we

shall soon perceive the just motives for which the inhabitants of the whole kingdom give so decided a preference to the actual government.

Charles III. was certainly known to possess a great character for probity, and many other distinguished qualities ; but he was wanting in the knowledge necessary for appreciating the resources offered him by the kingdom of Naples, and the genius of its inhabitants : he only conceived the project of a code of laws ; he undertook the construction of some public edifices in the capital of his estates, in which he left some traces of magnificence and utility ; but every branch of administration, and of political economy, were entirely neglected.

Naples possessed neither a civil, nor a criminal code, nor administrative laws. The people of the law, exclusively confined to the knowledge of the laws of the Lombards, of the municipal, of the Roman and canon law, disposed in an arbitrary manner of the fortune and of the liberty of the citizens. To this species of judiciary despotism and legislative chaos, was joined the absolute authority of the King, who, under the name of dispatches, or royal and ministerial decrees, made a capricious interpretation of the laws, destroying the effect and dispositions of them. These dispatches had even the force of laws, there not

being any power that could stop, or prevent the execution of them.

In Naples, with regard to judiciary or administrative institutions, and the public education, there were no traces, except in the remembrance of what had been done by the princes of the houses of Suabia and Arragon.

The policy of the last dynasty at Naples, was to annihilate every power that might counterbalance or temperate the royal authority. There were no means of opposing the absolute, or despotic power, but by the effect of two institutions. The first consisted of the strength and opinion of the feudal lords over their vassals; the second was in the simulacre of a national representation in the *Sedili* or *Piazze*, a species of corporations chiefly noble, which were permanent in the capital: the destroying of these two institutions, was the same as reducing the inhabitants of the finest country in the world, to the rank of the wretched population of Senegal, or the country of the Caffres.

This species of national representation of the *Sedili* or *Piazze* was abolished, and the places in which their sittings were held were demolished; so much did these princes redoubt even the traces of the edifices. In order the easier to deceive the Neapolitan nobility, on the motives of this



destructory proceeding, the government ordered all the ancient nobility to be numbered by classes, \*feigning that these, or rather the privileged few of the royal antichamber, would perfectly replace, in the administration of the city, those ancient bodies of the *Piazze*, who, joined to some members of the commercial community, for several centuries past, had invigilated over the public administration. Moreover, the policy of government was such as, 1st, To oblige the barons and great proprietors to reside at Naples under its jealous inspection : † in a short time all the provinces were deprived of their greatest landed proprietors, who, alone, had the power of rendering them rich and happy. 2d. To establish no where but in the capital, tribunals, colleges, universities, honours, employments, arts, manufactures, commerce, and even the printing-offices. It was thus that the rest of the kingdom was deprived, through a false and suspicious policy, of every means of *civilization*, and doomed to ignorance, misery, and servitude. It was thus that the provinces were abandoned, and nine parts in ten of the population reduced to a state almost of savages, whilst that, the other

\* By decree for the creation of a register called the *golden book*.

† A nobleman who made too long a residence on his estate became suspected, as a conspirator in the eyes of this government; nor could any gentleman go to his estates without permission.

tenth part, was destined to live amidst the intrigues of the court, and the tumult of the tribunals and courts of justice, consuming their lives and fortunes in the sterile enjoyments of luxury and effeminacy.

The government of Ferdinand sought in vain the means of inspiring a military and national spirit : where there is no example to follow, and where the concatenated order of a good administration exists not, there can be neither army nor country.

The government of Ferdinand was occupied in establishing a powerful navy ; but it was out of all proportion to the revenues of the states, and above all, with a state that possessed neither commerce, navigation, nor colonies. This great oversight in the government, produced those disastrous consequences that might be expected.

This is all that was done by the government of the former dynasty, from the year 1735, in the beautiful kingdom of Naples ; while on the contrary, in the course of a few years, under the new reign of *Joachim*, Naples possesses a civil code, a penal code, an administrative code, and a commercial code. Each province has its own tribunals ; people having suits at law, are no longer obliged to ruin themselves, by coming to Naples to solicit a judgment. Feudalism is abolished,

as well as all exclusive privileges ; the Neapolitans enjoy a perfect equality in the face of the law. The abuses of monastic institutions are destroyed, the prelates and ministers of the Catholic religion, the only ones protected by the law, enjoy all the consideration that is due to them, with stipends and funds proportioned to their decent maintenance.

Property is very much divided. A regular system of finance, that unfolds every year to the Neapolitan nation the true state of her wants, and her resources, presents at the same time a table of the established taxes, and of the disbursements made with the public revenues.

A national representation assembles every year, forming the councils of the commons, districts, and provinces ; the deputies are chosen by the people. These councils statute and deliberate on the objects of interior melioration, whether it be relative to the administration, or to the use made of the public money. They may propose plans of useful establishments, the king having reserved to himself the right of approbation. No law is published, unless approved of by the council of state.

All the provinces enjoy the benefit of colleges, lyceums, primary and secondary schools, and

charitable establishments. They have printing-offices, and manufactures ; in short, under the new government, all the inhabitants from Calabria ultra to the extremity of the Abruzzi, have within their reach all the different institutions, political, judiciary, administrative, and of public education ; and they have the means of making a progress in civilization, without being under the necessity of recurring to the capital.

As to the Neapolitan army, it is numerous, well looking, and brave: it has proved that the southern Italians have rivalled in courage, and the thirst of glory, even the Italians of the north, in the fields of battle, in Spain, in Germany, and in Italy.

This army, which, lead by its king, has distinguished itself under his orders, has nothing in common, nor that can be compared with the army of 1798, nor with that of 1806. It has for its chief, and for its model, a great captain, who has made his essays in Africa, as well as in Europe. It has imbibed a national spirit, because the sovereign who commands it, is occupied in promoting civilization, and causes the rights of the people to be respected.

I do not here speak merely of the troops of the line, which are equally remarkable for discipline,

and for exactness in their manœuvres. I owe the same praises to seventy thousand legionaries, or national guards, armed, enregimented, and all chosen from amongst the body of the proprietors of the kingdom. These are the seventy thousand legionaries, that, whilst the regular army was employed in Germany and in Spain, have alone defended all the coasts of the kingdom of Naples with as much zeal as bravery; and I might here invoke the testimony of my compatriots, the officers and sailors of the English navy, who are ever ready to do justice to the brave of all nations.

The navy is not gigantic, and out of proportion with the state of the revenue as in the time of Ferdinand. It is composed of good officers and sailors, and adapted to its principal destination, which is to defend the coasts, the commerce and the coasting trade, against the pirates, and Barbary powers.

Such are the various titles of the actual government to the affection of the people, who in Joachim Murat have placed all their hopes of a perfect civilization, of reform in the administration, and of the public welfare in general.

After this painting of the prosperity of the kingdom of Naples, is it possible to raise a doubt

whether it will most promote the happiness of the Neapolitan people, to continue to live under the reign of Joachim, author of so much good, or to retrograde by returning under the government of Ferdinand Bourbon?

To recal to the throne of Naples the former dynasty, would be to recal to the nation all the horrors of the fatal epoch of 1799. The last intelligence from Sicily proves, that it has learnt nothing, nothing has it forgotten, in the whole course of its political adversity. Why agitate a question, which cannot be discussed, but at the price of a foreign, or civil war? Let us abandon, let us treat as absurd reclamations, the voices of those who declaim against this opinion, not made with an intention to plead the cause of nations, but to satisfy a small number of ambitious men.

This would be to augur badly of the magnanimity of the high allied powers, of their profound wisdom, and of their great foresight, to suppose that in their eyes the unjust reclamations of some individuals, and of a dynasty almost forgotten (which is not in want of power nor riches in the island of Sicily,) should be of greater weight, than the happiness and prosperity of an entire nation, who delivered up its armies and treasure to support the cause of the allies in Italy, to ensure the independence, the safety, and the peace of

the various states of Europe. Ah, no ! Great Britain, who with such noble perseverance, has defended the cause of the emancipation of Europe, and of the liberty of every nation, will not repay with such black ingratitude, a sovereign who has made the greatest sacrifices in order to join in the cause of the high allied powers of the continent.

**THE END.**

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